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During World War II Americans were called upon repeatedly to salvage raw materials for the war
effort, often during brief, highly publicized "drives." Stories about the salvage drives are a staple in
both popular and scholarly histories of the home front, and in film documentaries, because the drives
appear to demonstrate the potential importance of non-economic motives such as patriotism and community
spirit. Here I reexamine economic effects of five drives: aluminum, silk, cooking fat, and the two most
important, iron and steel, and rubber. The drives, it turns out, had a more limited impact on the economy
than might be imagined from some of the enthusiastic portrayals in the popular and historical literatures.
At most, the drives increased scrap collections by relatively small margins above what would have
been collected during a prosperous peacetime period. The impact of economic incentives on the supply
of scrap materials, and the impact of the maneuvering of special interests for advantage, moreover,
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  Economics is a very unsatisfactory science. But it would have to be much more 
unsatisfactory than it is if such an event as a war, however extensive and destructive, 




I. The Conventional View of the Salvage Drives
2 
 
  During World War II there were repeated calls on the public to salvage raw materials for the 
war effort: tin cans, old phonograph records, copper, aluminum, iron and steel, paper, rubber, even 
used silk and nylon stockings and waste cooking fat. In principle recycling scrap material would be an 
ongoing process, but in most cases attention focused on a short-term campaign to "get in the scrap." 
President Roosevelt and other important figures from government and the private sector provided 
leadership. Propaganda campaigns run by the Office of War Information, and by private companies 
and trade associations, stressed the importance scrap collection. In peacetime it was just the family 
kitchen; now it was a combination "frontline bunker and rear-echelon miniature war plant" (Lingeman 
1970, 254). Explaining the conversion factors between salvaged materials and the munitions that could 
be produced from them drove the point home. As shown in Poster 1, Americans were told that 18 
tons of scrap metal went into a medium tank; it was therefore imperative that Americans "get in the 
scrap." One pound of fat, the public was also told, contained enough glycerine to make a pound of 
black powder, enough for six 75-mm shells; Twenty three hundred used nylon stockings contained 
enough nylon to make one parachute; and thirty thousand razor blades contained enough steel to make 
                     
1. An earlier version of this paper circulated with the title "Getting in the Scrap." But at that time I was 
unaware of the paper by Kirk (1995). 
 
2. I use the terms salvage drive and scrap drive to refer to the same events.  I lean toward the term 
salvage because it is, perhaps, a more dignified term suggesting the hard work that can go into the 
recycling of materials, especially by the professionals who brought in most of the scrap. But I use both 




50 30-caliber machine guns (Lingeman 1970, 254-55).  
  Enthusiastic descriptions of the salvage drives occur frequently in popular histories of the war. 
Film documentaries about the home front and school textbooks often draw attention to them. 
Recently, pundits have contrasted World War II, when the public was asked to participate in the war 
effort through the scrap drives – and in other ways such as by purchasing bonds or paying higher taxes 
– with the War in Iraq, when no such demands have been made. The salvage drives also appear 
frequently in scholarly histories.
3 One of the best recent histories of the war is William L. O'Neill's A 
Democracy at War. Although, O'Neill notes some problems in the scrap drives, he lavishes praise on 
the Nebraska iron and steel scrap drive of July and August 1942. This drive made use of considerable 
incentives. Prizes worth up to $2,000 in war bonds were given to individuals and organizations who 
collected the most scrap, and competition was fostered among Nebraska counties to see which could 
bring in the most scrap. The Nebraska drive was widely hailed as a great success. The newspaper that 
organized the drive won a Pulitzer Prize and the Nebraska drive became the model for the national 
drive (Kimble 2000). What historians find so attractive about the scrap drives can be seen in O'Neill’s 
(1993, 135) attempt to distill the underlying meaning of the Nebraska drive. 
  The most successful state drive yet, the Nebraska model was widely copied, 
demonstrating that the will was there and could be mobilized with inventive planning. If 
the weakness of democracy was inefficient government, the strength was volunteerism, 
especially when it exploited the national love of competition. 
 
 
The stories about the drives seem to show that something happened that could only have happened 
                                                                  
 
3. Taylor (1992, chapter 3, "The Great Scavenger Hunt," 71-100) is a superb collection of photographs of 






through voluntary community action. Market incentives were not important and government played 
only an enabling role: community spirit was the key. 
  Such stories pose a familiar challenge to economic historians. Typically, the models we use 
explain behavior as a rational response to (mainly) financial incentives. Non-economists often 
challenge this approach, arguing that these models fail to take into account a wide variety of non-
pecuniary motives. Wars provide a natural test. If non-pecuniary motives can override pecuniary 
motives at any time, then surely this must be true during wars – especially World War II, when the 
national consensus in favor of the war was overwhelming and people were constantly being asked to 
lay aside their personal interests in the interest of patriotism.  
  Patriotism may have influenced decisions at many points in the war economy. Mulligan (1998), 
for example, found evidence of the effects of patriotism on labor force participation. Here I look for 
the effects of patriotism on the supply of raw materials. If patriotism was a potent force that revoked 
ordinary economic constraints, then surely we should observe it in this case. The drives occurred in the 
darkest hours of the war, when victory appeared far from inevitable. The Office of War Information 
invoked patriotic feelings to encourage participation in the scrap drives. The posters it created have 
helped to shape the social memory of the war.
4  Government officials from the President on down and 
business leaders lent their authority to the drives. Even after the formal drives ended, government 
propaganda urged Americans to "keep on scrapping" (Poster 2).  
  Below I examine five drives in detail: for aluminum, used stockings, waste cooking fat, iron 
                     
4. The Office of War Information was created in June 1942, combining the functions of several 
predecessor agencies. It was the subject of bitter internal and external criticism. Indeed, in 1943 a 
number of prominent writers, including the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. resigned in protest. One 
complaint was that the Office's propaganda emphasized safe subjects, such as the campaign for scrap 





and steel, and rubber. This is not a complete list of materials salvaged during the war. As I noted at the 
outset, the list was long and varied. But the drives discussed here include the two most important – 
iron and steel, and rubber – and what are probably the best known drives for other materials. The 
questions are straightforward. Why were patriotic salvage drives used? How were the drives 
influenced by the economic and technical constraints faced by the participants? Finally, how successful 
were the drives in increasing the supply of raw materials? The last question occurs naturally to an 
economic historian. We always want to know the answer to the question that starts with – by how 
much. By how much did the railroads increase real GDP? By how much did the stock market crash of 
1929, or the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, or the banking crises lower real GDP? Typically, non-economic 
historians are enthusiastic about the salvage drives, and they often cite statistics about how much was 
collected (so many pounds or pounds per person), but they do not address the question of how much 
in terms that an economic historian would consider crucial. One might take the additional, speculative 
step and guess from the tone of the discussions that historians believe that the drives added 
significantly to the supply of raw materials. But this paper is the first that I am aware of that addresses 
the effect on the supply of raw materials in explicit quantitative terms. My conclusion is that the drives 
increased the supplies of raw material at most by small amounts. In making this point, my purpose is 
not to denigrate the spirit of self-sacrifice that motivated the drives, or to deny that they had any effect 
on the supply of raw materials. But I do challenge the idea that the scrap drives made vast amounts of 
additional materials available that would not have been available had normal sources of supply been 
relied upon, and that the drives prove that conventional economic analysis needs to be jettisoned "for 
the duration. 
 




  It was obvious to both the public and to policy makers from the start of American rearmament 
in the late 1930s that aluminum would be a key raw material, although even so policy makers and 
industry officials underestimated the increase in demand produced by the aircraft program.
5 The price 
of aluminum scrap rose rapidly, and it became one of the first prices formally fixed by the Office of 
Price Administration. It issued its schedule of prices for aluminum scrap in March 1941 (Wall Street 
Journal, March 24, 1941, p. 5). In July 1941, responding to concerns about the adequacy of the 
supply of aluminum for the aircraft program that had produced spontaneous local scrap drives, Mayor 
Fiorello H. LaGuardia of New York, who was serving as Roosevelt's Director of Civilian Defense, 
announced a two-week national drive to collect aluminum cookware and other items. There was an 
unforgettable response. Coffeepots, frying pans, skillets, stew pots, cocktail shakers, ice-cube forms, 
artificial legs, cigar tubes, watchcases, and radio parts were piled in great scrap heaps. "In Lubbock, 
Texas, a likeness of Adolph Hitler was placed in the middle of the courthouse square as a target for 
the pots and pans hurled by citizens" (Goodwin 1994, 260). 
  Why use a "drive" with a time limit to get in the scrap? Why not simply ask people to bring in 
the scrap as soon as possible? After all, sorting and distributing the scrap would be easier if it came in 
slowly and steadily. In most cases, as we noted above, people were encouraged to "keep on 
scrapping" after the official drive ended, but short drives had several advantages. First, the spirit of 
competition could be invoked.  It became a football game with town pitted against town, and state 
against state, to see who could bring in the most scrap before the final whistle. A second reason for a 
short drive was that it permitted the monitoring necessary to bring social pressures to bear. With 
everyone going to the collection point at the same time people could see whether their neighbors were 
                     
 




participating: rewarding participants with a hearty pat on the back, and punishing non-participants with 
a sharply arched eyebrow. A third reason for a short drive – one that was especially important, as we 
will see, for rubber – was that it yielded information. A drive would tell policy makers how much was 
out there and allow them to plan other measures – limitations on production for civilian markets, new 
production facilities, and so on – to deal with conditions in the market for the raw material. 
  In announcing the aluminum campaign LaGuardia had called for 20,000,000 pounds of 
aluminum scrap, enough to make 2,000 planes (New York Times, June 25, 1941, p.23). In truth, the 
scrap collected in the drive would be, for the most part, unsuitable for the production of the high-grade 
aluminum needed for warplanes.
 6 Indeed, before the war it had been customary for dealers to sell 
aluminum scrap in unsegregated bundles that was used only to produce lower grade products. After 
Pearl Harbor an effort was made to force the dealers to separate aluminum scrap by quality to make 
more high quality scrap available. It seems unlikely, however, that even with improved sorting much of 
the scrap of sufficiently high quality for aircraft production would be found. And, as we will note 
below, the junk dealers who might have separated the high-grade aluminum scrap were cut out of the 
drive. The pots and pans collected in the drive, although few contributors were aware of it, were 
destined to be made into products other than aircraft (New York Times, June 26, 1941, p. 25). 
Conceivably, some of the families that participated enthusiastically in the aluminum drive by 
contributing some of their old pots and pans eventually were forced to buy new ones made from the 
those they had donated (O'Neill 1992, 131; Goodwin 1994, 260-61). 
  The aluminum drive and Mayor LaGuardia eventually came in for a great deal of criticism. 
                                                                  
the aluminum drive, which as we will see, was unimportant for the supply of aluminum during the war. 
 
6. The British had undertaken an aluminum drive in 1940 – this may have been one of the inspirations for 




There were long delays in moving the scrap to the refineries. People who were told that they had to 
sacrifice their pots and pans to save the country watched and waited while the great heaps of scrap 
created in the drives continued to stand. Richard Lingeman (1970, 16) put it this way: "it [the 
aluminum drive] turned into a fiasco, with great piles of pots and pans languishing in collection points 
because no one would cart the stuff away, and anyhow, its value in plane production was nonexistent." 
About a year after the drive the War Production Board issued a report explaining why less scrap 
aluminum was collected than expected and why there were long delays in getting the scrap to the 
refiners. Part of the problem was that Mayor LaGuardia had cut the junk dealers out of the process 
(Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1942, p. 5; New York Times, June 20, 1942, p. 7). LaGuardia did so 
for the usual reason: they were simply middlemen who contributed nothing to the production process, 
but profited from it by speculating on the price of scrap aluminum. Cutting out the middlemen, 
LaGuardia thought, would save money and do no harm. But the refineries preferred to buy scrap that 
had been sorted by the junkmen when they could get it, rather than the unsorted bundles provided by 
the drive. To be sure, many of the dollar-a-year men who served with the War Production Board 
were ideologically opposed to the New Deal mayor from New York, so a report blaming LaGuardia 
would be to their liking. Any projections of the amount of scrap to be collected, moreover, would 
have been highly problematic and would have been made, understandably, with an eye toward 
generating enthusiasm for the drive. Nevertheless, cutting out the skilled junk men surely was a mistake 
that reduced the efficiency of the sorting and distribution of the material collected. 
  The scrap drive brought it about 6,400,000 pounds of aluminum (Wall Street Journal, June 
20, 1942, p. 5). As an isolated figure this sounds like a great deal, a mountain of aluminum. A 
comparison with production in 1941, however, is revealing. The amount salvaged, was 6.75 percent 
                                                                  




of total production from old scrap, 2.99 percent of total production from recycled aluminum (a larger 
sum that also includes waste recycled within aluminum plants), and only .77 percent of total production 
(Historical Statistics 2006, series Db88, Db89, and Db90). The amount collected was about 0.08 
percent of total production during the war (1942-45). These figures would be lower still if adjusted for 
the low quality of the scrap-drive aluminum. The real solution to the aluminum problem was maximizing 
production in existing aluminum refineries and building of new ones. Overall, production of aluminum 
almost tripled from 377,000 metric tons in 1941 to 1,120,000 metric tons in 1943 (Historical 
Statistics 2006, series Db88). 
  The aluminum drive, although unimportant as a source of aluminum, may have been important 
in shaping public opinion and mobilizing support for U.S. involvement in the war. This was important 
before Pearl Harbor when many Americans were still strongly opposed to joining the war. According 
to Doris Kearns Goodwin, what Roosevelt had accomplished with the aluminum drive "was nothing 
less than an exhibition of the dormant energies of patriotic democracy" (Goodwin 1994, 261). Still, 
one can question whether historians in other circumstances would view the same policy with the same 
results so favorably. Suppose that in a later, less popular, war a president ordered a salvage drive that 
turned out to be a fiasco, at least as far as many observers were concerned, with great heaps of scrap 
left to weather in public squares. Would historians of this unpopular war view the decision to launch an 
aluminum drive favorably? Alternatively, would they view it as further confirmation of the 






III. Used Silk and Nylon Stockings
7 
  Before the war silk came to the United States largely from Japan, with smaller amounts from 
China and other countries. It had two military uses: parachutes and powder bags. Its lightweight, 
strength, and the ease with which it could be folded and unfolded without leaving a crease made it 
ideal for parachutes. When the War began experiments were just underway to make parachutes out of 
nylon. Nylon proved superior and, as it turned out, almost all parachutes produced during the war 
were made of nylon. Silk was also used for the bags that held powder behind artillery shells, especially 
in large naval guns. Silk burned completely whereas bags made of other fibers left glowing embers. 
Eventually, however, ways were found to make satisfactory bags from cotton, wool, and rayon.  
  Japan restricted shipments of silk to the United States in 1941, making it difficult to 
accumulate stocks, and embargoed all shipments shortly before Pearl Harbor. With Japanese silk 
embargoed, a drive to bring in used silk (and nylon) stockings seemed logical, and silk and nylon 
stocking drives arose spontaneously, that is without encouragement from the government. One such 
drive in Dallas, Texas yielded some 662 pounds of worn stockings. Unfortunately, when the war 
began there were no processes available for reclaiming used silk or nylon. Experts at the War 
Production Board felt that it was only a matter of time before such processes were developed. But 
until proof was available, the military would not accept delivery of used stockings. All that the War 
Production Board could do was write polite letters telling the collectors that they could not use the 
stockings (Walton 1945, 177). 
  Eventually, as the War Production Board predicted, methods were developed for recycling 
worn silk and nylon stockings. On November 15, 1942 the War Production Board launched an 
                     
7. This section is based largely on Walton (1945). Frank L. Walton was director of the Textile, Clothing, 




official drive that continued until March 15, 1943, when the supply appeared to have dried up. The 
drive brought in an impressive amount of stockings, some 880,000 pounds, about one pair for every 
2.7 women. This was about 3.26 percent of the peak annual rate of production of nylon (which 
occurred in May 1944) of 27,000,000 pounds, before allowing for the material lost in the recycling 
(Dewhurst and Associates 1947, 779). In other words, the amount collected, assuming a 100 percent 
recovery rate, yielded the equivalent of about 12 day's of production at the peak rate.  
  It appears that the War Production Board's Textile Division, perhaps because they were 
aware of these figures, did not consider used silk and nylon very important. One piece of evidence of 
the Textile Division's attitude toward used silk can be read from its approach to the opened bales of 
silk still in the hands of the mills when the war began. In the months leading up to the silk drive the 
Textile Division encouraged the mills to make
 stockings from opened bales. Had the Textile Division 
been convinced that silk was crucial to the war effort, and had it believed that ways would be found to 
recover silk from opened bales or from completed stockings, it would have commandeered all 
unopened bales at the mills, and all finished stockings.  
  On the first day of the national used stocking drive the Textile Division heard stories about 
women turning in used stockings and then buying new ones (Walton 1945, 178). Whether true or not, 
the Textile Division immediately issued a directive advising women to turn in only stockings that were 
completely worn out, so that there would be no increase in the demand for new stockings. Since at 
this time new stockings were made mainly from cotton and rayon, it is clear that the purpose of the 
directive was not to maximize the supply of used silk and nylon, but rather to reduce the risk that some 
consumers would face empty shelves for new non-silk-non-nylon stockings. If the textile division 
considered used silk and nylon crucial to the war effort, they would have asked consumers to turn in 




  The reason the Textile Division downplayed the significance of used silk and nylon was 
probably the availability of large supplies of nylon. Dupont had developed nylon in the early 1930s. 
The price of silk had been high in the late 1930s, and Dupont had gone full speed ahead toward large-
scale production. This contrasts with synthetic rubber, where low prices of imported natural rubber 
discouraged mass production of synthetics. As early as January of 1940 an article in the Far Eastern 
Survey outlined the potential threat to Japan's silk industry posed by nylon, even though actual 
production at that time was limited (Farley 1940). The War delayed full-scale production of eagerly 
awaited nylon stockings for the home front – a sentiment captured in "Fats" Waller and George 
Marion Jr.'s "When the Nylons Bloom Again" – but it appears that the supply of nylon was adequate 
for military purposes. The stocking drives, to sum up, did not play an important role in the production 
of silk or nylon for the war effort.   
 
IV. Cooking Fat 
  During the war women – in those days propaganda aimed at the home was aimed at women – 
were asked to save cooking fat. The fat was then exchanged at butcher shops for red ration points 
(for meat, fish, and dairy) and cash. Advertisements explained that the fat saved contributed to the war 
effort because fat was the source of glycerine, a key ingredient in explosives. Poster 3, a striking 
design by Henry Koerner, makes the point vividly. Another poster (not shown) spelled it out in simple, 
hard-hitting language: "...fat makes glycerine. And glycerine makes explosives for us and our allies – 
explosives to down Axis planes, stop their tanks, sink their ships" (Cohen 1991, 111). 
  In fact, the demand for glycerine to make explosives had little to do with the fat salvage drive. 
Only a small proportion of the U.S. production of rendered animal fat was needed for this purpose, 




for what they needed. Rather, the fat salvage drive was undertaken for the soap makers who 
organized and financed the drive. Soap production was high during the war by prewar standards 
(Russell 1947, 248). And fat supplies were also relatively abundant, especially later in the war. By 
January of 1944, lard was so abundant that the government was having storage difficulties (Fantin 
1947, 209). But price controls meant that there was excess demand for soap. Early in the war 
(organizational meetings for the fat salvage campaign began in April 1942) soap makers feared that if 
soap was rationed, then some of the consumers forced to cut their use of soap during the war would 
learn that they could do with less. Rationing, in other words, would spoil postwar markets.
8 As far as 
the soap producers were concerned, anything that would avoid the need to ration soap was worth 
doing. Hence the plan organized by the soap makers to offer consumers cash and red points in 
exchange for fat.  
  From the beginning there was opposition to the plan. The Office of Price Administration was 
concerned that the fat salvage plan would produce an excess supply of red ration points, undermining 
the rationing program (Russell 1947, 239). Indeed, not all of the fat renderers favored the plan. The 
Eastern Melter's Association opposed the plan perhaps because it was concerned about a decline in 
the price of rendered fat that renderers in other parts of the country could offset with a larger volume, 
but that its renderers could not. Despite these concerns, the Office of Price Administration agreed at a 
meeting on November 22, 1943 to pay two red points and 2 cents for each pound of fat. The 
program was announced in December 1943. Since the fat would be generated continuously in the 
nation's kitchens it was by nature an ongoing program rather than a short-term campaign.  
  The advertising created by the American Fat Salvage Committee was financed by the soap 
                     
8. The preservation of postwar markets was a major preoccupation of the War Advertising Council, a 




makers, although this was somewhat hidden from the public. Butcher shops could display a sign that 
read “Official Fact Collecting Station.” These were prepared by the “Glycerine Producers and 
Associated Industries with the Approval of the War Production Board.” War Production Board was 
in large capital letters.  The campaign was so aggressive in linking fat salvage to military uses that 
Chester Bowles, the head of the Office of Price Administration, wrote to Lever Brothers complaining 
about the misleading nature of the campaign (Russell 1947, 252). The campaign played no positive 
role in the mobilization of resources for the war effort. It may have had a positive effect, however, on 
the morale of people who could not otherwise find a way in their daily lives of contributing to the war 
effort. It provided, moreover, a way of assuaging the anxieties of children about the war by giving 
them a way of participating in the war. Nevertheless, one wonders what would have happened if a 
similar plan had been adopted in other wars. Suppose that during an unpopular later war a president 
had launched a fat salvage campaign that, as in World War II, was ostensibly about  providing the raw 
materials to make bombs, but in fact was about providing fat for soap makers so they could avoid 
rationing. Suppose that in that unpopular later war the administrator in charge of price controls – 
widely respected as an outstanding public servant – was troubled by the deception. The deception, 
most likely, would be revealed during the war by an aggressive press and add to the public's 
discontent with the war. Even if the deception went undetected during the war, a later generation of 
historians, if they shared the public's disapproval of the war, would be more likely to condemn the 
campaign as a cynical attempt to deceive the public and benefit private interests than to celebrate it as 
a brilliant tactic for mobilizing public opinion.   
                                                                  




V. Iron and Steel 
  In the late 1930s and early 1940s recovery from the 1937-38 recession, rearmament, and 
European munitions purchases increased the demand for iron and steel, and iron and steel scrap. Iron 
and steel scrap purchased from dealers rose 41.6 percent between 1939 and 1941 (Figure 1 and 
Table 1, column 2). Increases in demand in turn produced increases in the prices of iron and steel 
scrap. The price of No. 1 heavy steel melting scrap rose 17.4 percent between 1939 and 1941 
(Figure 2 and Table 1, column 5). It was obvious at the time, moreover, that if the United States 
entered the war scrap prices would go much higher.  
  To Leon Henderson, who was in charge of price stabilization for the National Defense 
Advisory Commission, the forerunner of the Office of Price Administration, increases in scrap iron and 
steel prices were an intolerable threat to the economy. In January 1941 he warned scrap dealers 
repeatedly that if they did not voluntarily reduce prices of iron and steel scrap, "drastic steps" toward 
price control would be taken (Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1941, p.2). And this proved no idle 
threat. Iron and steel scrap prices were placed under control in April 1941, well before Pearl Harbor, 
and were not freed until November 1946 (Barringer 1954, 51). Indeed, as shown in Figure 2, the 
Office of Price Administration succeeded in keeping the nominal price of scrap flat during the war. As 
a result, the real price of scrap fell as the general price level rose. Reported scrap prices, it is true, may 
not be entirely accurate. There are convincing stories about "expediters" who could help find materials, 
for a price, about individual firms paying more than the official price, and about low-grade scrap being 
sold as high-grade scrap. But to judge from the frequency of such stories, the impression conveyed by 
Figure 2, a sharp upward movement in prices cut short by controls, is probably broadly correct, at 
least for the initial years of the war. The picture may be less reliable for the latter part of the war. 




level before controls were imposed was an important market response that would provide the 
incentive to find more scrap and to economize on the use of scrap. Such an economist would not be 
surprised to find steel companies complaining about a shortage of scrap during the first half of 1942. 
Fixing the price of scrap, to this way of thinking, reduced the productivity of the war economy. 
Inflation, to such an economist, would be a macro-economic problem that should be attacked with 
monetary policy, or more likely given the professional consensus of the day, fiscal policy, not by fixing 
the price of scrap iron and steel. Henderson and the Office of Price Administration, however, saw 
things differently. In their view, the important fact was that the price of scrap was a component of the 
price of steel, which in turn was a strategic price in the war economy. If scrap prices were allowed to 
rise it would "start an inflationary price spiral whose consequences would have been disastrous for the 
stabilization program" (Benes 1947, 8). This view, which some economists today might justify on the 
grounds that price fixing was shaping expectations, was widely held by policy makers in the 1940s. To 
put it somewhat differently, inflation to Henderson and the Office of Price Administration economists 
was a kind of economic cancer: it could be controlled only by detecting it early and cutting it from the 
body economic before it could spread. 
  The decision to fix the prices of iron and steel scrap, whatever its benefits in reducing 
inflationary expectations nevertheless appears to have had negative consequences for the efficiency of 
the industry. The small dealer who drove his wagon from house to house buying scrap was a familiar 
figure in the Depression and earlier years.
9 He was an important part of the mechanism for collecting 
scrap. During the war, however, the number of small dealers "diminished sharply" (Benes 1947, 5). 
Perhaps some loss in the number of small dealers was inevitable. Many were pulled into the war 
                     
9. They were often referred to as peddlers, but this was a term they rejected, especially when it had 




industries where wages rose substantially. Indeed, many probably viewed the war as an opportune 
moment to make a change they had long contemplated. But the falling real price for scrap, which 
created losses that could be offset only by evading the law, must have helped push small dealers from 
the field. The Office of Price Administration, moreover, had considerable difficulty formulating lists of 
official prices for an industry characterized by a multitude of dealers, products, and shipping costs. 
Early experiments with prices controlled at the point of delivery gave way over time to an elaborate 
basing point system. In October 1944 a shortage of scrap loomed, and was met by eliminating many 
restrictions on where, what, and to whom dealers could sell (Benes 1947, 19-30). 
  Given the steel industry's voracious appetite for scrap – scrap was a necessary ingredient for 
the production of open-hearth steel – given the freezing of scrap prices, and given the history of drives 
in earlier wars, it was nearly inevitable that there would be an iron and steel scrap drive. The first 
initiatives came from the steel companies and from International Harvester. Then in the summer of 
1942 the War Production Board backed these private sector efforts with a call for a national drive. 
Lessing J. Rosenwald, the director of the Conservation Division of the War Production Board, was 
the government’s chief spokesman. As with the other drives, the response was dramatic. In California 
Walt Disney donated two iron deer (Bambi?) from his front lawn. The deer, it was said, contained 
enough iron to make one 75-mm field piece or 10,000 incendiary bombs (New York Times, August 
11, 1942, p. 22). In New York many towns donated the cannons on the town square, some dating to 
the Civil War and earlier conflicts. At Fort Ticonderoga, the Revolutionary War action in which 
General Henry Knox retrieved Ticonderoga’s cannons was reenacted, and the cannon were donated 
to the scrap drive (Hoopes 1977, 146-47). Roosevelt chimed in, promising that any towns that 
donated old cannons would get new World War II guns after the war. He also suggested, demurely, 




ones after the war (New York Times, August 8, 1942, p. 9). 
  As shown in Poster 1 farm country was an especially inviting target for scrap collection 
because farmers often held on to used farm machinery. International Harvester encouraged the 
collection of farm scrap and its dealerships served as collection centers. Harvester’s involvement was 
undoubtedly motivated mainly by patriotism. But it did say that improving the relationships between 
farmers and Harvester dealers would pay postwar dividends. There was also, I should note, a direct 
connection with postwar markets. Farmers normally cannibalized their junked farm machines for used 
parts to keep older machines running. If the junked machines were scrapped during the war, it would 
be harder to keep old machines running after the war, forcing farmers to buy new ones.    
  One might be tempted by stories about the dramatic response to the iron and steel scrap drive 
to conclude that unprecedented amounts of scrap were collected. Stories about melting down old 
cannons and about the great poundages collected, however, need to be viewed in relationship to the 
statistical data on the supply of scrap. Historians, unfortunately, repeat the stories and bypass the 
numbers. The numbers, however, are revealing. Figure 1 shows iron and steel scrap purchased from 
American dealers for domestic consumption (Table 1, column 2) and for export (Table 1, column 3), 
and the peak-to-peak (1937 –1948) trend. The plot of domestic consumption follows a strong 
upward trend punctuated by recessions. Surprisingly, however, the war years do not stand out as 
years of unprecedented consumption. Consumption does show a local peak in the 1942, but that peak 
is lower than might be inferred from enthusiastic tales about the wartime scrap drives. Purchases in 
1942 were 7.0 percent above the level in the rearmament year 1941, but they were 18.2 percent 
below the first postwar peak in 1948.
10 Purchases in 1942, as shown in Figure 1, were close to, if 
                     
10. Postwar salvage, however, was made somewhat easier because large amounts of scrap were 




anything a bit below, the peak-to-peak trend. 
  Figure 1 also shows exports. In the late 1930s exports of scrap iron and steel to Japan 
became controversial because, critics claimed, they were sustaining Japanese military expansion. For 
this reason, and also because it was feared that the exports were driving up domestic prices of  scrap, 
exports of scrap iron and steel were embargoed in 1940: an embargo covering heavy melting steel, 
which was thought to be important militarily, was put in place in August, followed by a total embargo 
in October. The decline in exports, however, was not produced solely by the embargoes. Exports to 
Japan had been falling before the embargoes, as a result of rising scrap prices and regulations imposed 
by the Japanese government (Odell 1940, Newcomb 1940). As can be seen in Figure 1, as important 
as the scrap exports may have been from a strategic or political point of view, eliminating them made 
relatively small amounts available for domestic consumption. Banning exports, like the salvage 
campaign, did not succeed in pushing domestic consumption above trend. Since banning exports 
worked in the same direction as the patriotic drives – to make more scrap available to domestic 
purchasers – the decision to ban exports leaves even less scrap to be explained by the patriotic drive. 
  An alternative to the peak-to-peak trend for estimating counterfactual consumption 
(consumption of scrap in the absence of the drive) is a regression of the amount of scrap iron and steel 
consumed on variables measuring the supply and demand for scrap iron and steel. The fitted values 
from such an equation would show what might have been expected in a peacetime economy 
experiencing a similar boom, and the differences between actual consumption and the fitted values 
would measure the effects of the patriotic drives in bringing out additional scrap.  




and steel scrap (Table 1, column 1 plus column 2).
11 The independent variables were consumption 
lagged one period, contemporaneous industrial production, industrial production lagged one period, 
and dummy variables for the war years. Industrial production was used as the demand measure 
because it might capture some of the shift toward heavy industry during the war. I did not include 
prices because they were distorted by controls during the war. Hence, the regression is a reduced 
form that implicitly assumes peacetime price responses. This is the right way to go, given the questions 
I am most concerned with, because it allows me to compare what did happen with what would have 
happened in a prosperous peacetime economy that relied on normal market processes to bring in the 
scrap. I examined equations with up to six of scrap consumption and industrial production. None of 
the coefficients on higher order lags were significant, and adding additional lags did not improve the 
overall fit of the equation, or alter the conclusions with respect to the war years. The results are shown 
in Part A of Table 2. Although the coefficients on the war dummies are significant in 1943 and 1944, 
they have the wrong sign. Patriotic scrap drives, if they were having a big effect, should have raised 
consumption in those years above what it otherwise would have been. Conceivably, the desire to hold 
on to iron and steel scrap because of an expectation of higher prices once price controls were lifted – 
news stories did suggest that some scrap dealers were reluctant to part with stocks accumulated over 
decades – more than offset the patriotic motive. But this may be reading too much into the results. I 
also estimated the equation after taking natural logarithms of the variables. Taking natural logarithms 
makes interpreting the coefficients easier (they are percentages) and experience shows that logarithmic 
models often work well with time series data. But the results were similar: the coefficients on the 
                     
 
11. The results are similar if purchased scrap (Table 1 column 2) is made the dependent variable. 
Intuitively, this series would be more likely to show the effects of the drives since producers purchased 




wartime dummies had the “wrong” sign, but in this model they were not statistically significant.  
  Tests, such as an Augmented Dickey-Fuller, suggested that there could be a unit root in the 
scrap consumption and industrial production series, so I also estimated the equation in first differences. 
The results are reported in Part B of Table 2. In this model, again, all of the wartime coefficients are 
negative, suggesting smaller increments in the consumption of reclaim than would have been expected, 
rather than the larger increments. But the coefficients are not significant, and there remains evidence of 
serial correlation in the estimated model. The safest conclusion from the regressions is that there is no 
evidence of a large positive effect from patriotism. I also estimated the equation in first difference of 
natural logarithms of the variables (percentage changes), with similar results. 
  Regressions cannot capture all of the costs of collecting scrap that were unique to the war 
years. We should, therefore, also give some weight to estimates made at the time by experts with an 
intimate knowledge of the market. Perhaps the estimate with the greatest claim to authority was made 
by Edwin C. Barringer. Barringer (1954, 54) argued that the drives did bring in additional scrap, and 
estimated that in 1942 and 1943 the salvage drives yielded about 4,000,000 additional tons of scrap. 
This was about 8.33 percent of consumption of purchased scrap in 1942 and 1943 and 3.67 percent 
of total consumption of scrap (Table 1, columns 1 and 2). He adds, "During the entire war perhaps 
about 9,000,000 tons was brought out that would not have been available to dealers under normal 
conditions." This was about 9.61 percent of purchased scrap and 4.21 percent of total scrap from 
1942 through 1945 (Table 1, columns 1 and 2). Salvage-drive scrap was lighter than normal scrap, 
and according to Barringer, the mills preferred normal scrap when they could get it (Wall Street 
Journal, November 28, 1942, p. 1).  These percentages, therefore, undoubtedly overstate the yield 
of the scrap drive compared with a statistic in which the numerator and denominator were measured in 




Steel, a trade group representing the scrap dealers, and they sponsored his book. As a trade group 
they had an interest in stressing the contribution of professional dealers. To my knowledge, however, 
Barringer's book is the best-informed account of the industry during this period, and has a strong claim 
to authority.  
  Altogether the evidence of the peak-to-peak trend, the regressions, and Barringer’s estimates 
suggest that the drives added at most a few percentage points to the supply of scrap.  How significant 
was a "small" percentage increase in the supply of scrap? Measured in months of consumption at the 
1941 rate, Barringer's estimate of 9,000,000 additional tons, the highest estimate that we have 
discussed, was only about two months worth of consumption of scrap: without the drives it would 
have taken two additional months for the private sector to produce and consume the same amount of 
scrap.
12 Measured against total steel production, Barringer's estimate would appear smaller. It 
amounted to about 1.6 percent of total steel production during the war (Historical Statistics 2006, 
series Dd399, Dd405 -407). To put it in more familiar terms, this was about 24 days of production. 
Conceivably, the timing of scrap collection could be crucial. A great battle, one could imagine, could 
turn on the deployment of a small amount of arms, so any slowdown in the flow of scrap that slowed 
production and prevented these particular arms from reaching the crucial battlefield at the crucial 
moment could be important (Kimble 2007, 95-96). “But for want of a nail …” But absent an 
argument of this sort that magnifies the impact of the availability of scrap at a particular moment, it is 
clear that even in the absence of the patriotic salvage drives the United States would have produced 
                     
12. In principle a large part of previously produced steel could have been salvaged and recycled at a 
price because little steel is lost before an article made from it is scrapped. Potentially, the scrap heap 
was, to simplify somewhat, the sum of previous production. Therefore, the danger of running out of 
scrap was relatively small. When it comes to rubber, the situation was somewhat different, and I will 





enough scrap iron and steel to supply its steel industry and to equip its fighting forces 
 
VI. Rubber 
  The Rubber drive was the most important. There was no question that given time the United 
States could produce large quantities of aluminum, copper, steel, and most of the other materials 
needed for the war because the United States produced the raw materials or could import them from 
allies or neutrals. In most of the cases in which the United States had depended on sources that were 
cut off by the war, it could make do with substitutes. In the case of tin, for example, the U.S. 
developed sources in the New World. And in the case of silk, the United States made do with nylon. 
But rubber remained a problem. Japanese military expansion in Southeast Asia cut off the United 
States and her Allies from their major sources of natural rubber – sources that had supplied ninety 
percent of U.S. raw rubber before the war. The United States was producing only small amounts of 
synthetic rubber for specialty purposes Although the basic chemistry for producing general purpose 
synthetic rubbers was understood, many technical hurdles had to be overcome. No one, in other 
words, could be sure how long it would take to get a large-scale synthetic rubber industry going. The 
fear that the United States would not have sufficient rubber to maintain its domestic transport system 
and equip its fighting forces, to sum up, was based firmly in reality.
13  
  Table 3, which shows the "rubber budget" of the United States during the war, demonstrates 
that reclaimed rubber played an important role in closing the "rubber gap" during the first two years of 
U.S. involvement.  Nevertheless, it was only one of five ways in which the United States closed the 
                     
13. There was also the fear that the stock of rubber was vulnerable to sabotage. On October 11, 1941 a 
fire at a Firestone plant in Fall River Massachusetts destroyed a large amount of the U.S. stockpile (New 
York Times, October 13, 1941, p.1). Although the FBI investigated; the state fire marshal later attributed 




rubber gap:    
  (1) Running down the stock of raw rubber. Sizeable imports in 1940 and 1941, based on the 
fear that access to Asian sources would be disrupted, had built up America's stocks. The Rubber 
Reserve Company, a federal agency founded in June 1940, had purchased much of this rubber. 
Initially, according to Herbert Feis (1947), he and like-minded State Department officials had pushed 
for an aggressive buying program, but were thwarted by Jesse Jones of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation who set tight limits on the prices the Rubber Reserve would pay. Eventually, when the 
private rubber companies found themselves desperately bidding against each other for raw rubber, 
and outbidding the Rubber Reserve, the decision was reached to make the Rubber Reserve the sole 
buyer. By the end of 1941 the United States had a stock of 533,000 long tons of rubber equal to over 
eight months consumption at the 1941 rate; by 1945 the U.S. had a stock of about 45,000 long tons, 
equal to about 5 months consumption at the much lower wartime rate (Table 3, column 3). 
  (2) Increasing production of natural rubber in areas controlled by the Allies. Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon) was the major remaining producer after the Japanese thrust into Southeast Asia, and its 
output increased substantially. Attempts were also made to increase production in Liberia, to buy wild 
rubber in Latin America, and even to plant rubber producing crops such as guayule in the United 
States. Together, however, these efforts produced only small amounts. Imports of natural rubber 
during the war (Table 3, column 1) remained well below prewar levels. As late as 1945 the United 
States imported only 139 thousand long tons, about 30 percent of imports in the depression year 
1935. 
  (3) Building synthetic rubber plants. The technology for producing synthetic rubber, as noted 
above, was available, but plants sufficient to supply the American markets did not exist. The 




Finance Corporation, but no one could be sure how long it would take to get the new plants up and 
running. The synthetic rubber program, however, proved a success, and was providing substantial 
supplies by the fourth quarter of 1943. In 1944, their first full year of operation, the United States 
consumed 567 thousand long tons (Table 4, column 3), matching or exceeding consumption of rubber 
of all types in most prewar years. In 1945 the United States consumed 694 thousand long tons, 
exceeding consumption in any prewar year.
14 
  As it turned out, the United States finished the war with stocks of rubber that were adequate, 
if barely so. Nevertheless, the sense of urgency at the beginning of the war was justified. The last line 
of Table 3,  *1943, is a counterfactual rate of consumption which assumes that the synthetic rubber 
program was able to deliver only 50 percent more rubber in 1943 than in 1942, rather than the 10-
fold increase that actually occurred. On this plausible assumption, and given maintenance of the 
wartime rate of consumption of rubber, the stock of rubber on hand would have been exhausted.   
  (4) Conserving rubber. The military changed its specifications to minimize the use of rubber. 
Civilian production was limited and supplies were rationed. Civilian rationing began, John Kenneth 
Galbraith (1981, 152-56) tells us, with his order, issued immediately after Pearl Harbor, prohibiting 
the sale of new automobile tires. His fear was that a rush to buy the existing stock would leave dealer 
shelves empty. Shortly afterwards, a rationing system was introduced that allowed people in essential 
occupations – doctors, police officers, and after a political dustup, ministers – to buy tires. A series of 
orders from the War Production Board prohibited the production of new tires for the civilian market 
for the first nine months of 1942 (Wendt 1947, 216-17).   
  It is tempting to view the prohibition of tire production for the civilian market and related 
                     





orders as important in pushing the industry into production for the military, but there was a pull as well 
as a push. Official government orders prohibiting production for the civilian market may have been 
merely a useful excuse for producers who wanted to break relations with long-term customers and 
concentrate on highly profitable military contracts. One part of the pull story is easy to verify; profits of 
the tire companies rose substantially during the war. Net income of the tire companies rose from $54 
million in 1940 (the best previous year was $51 million in 1927) to a wartime record of $312 million in 
1943 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1950, 9). These figures are in nominal terms, but even if we 
allow for the increase in the measured price level – the GDP deflator increased about 20 percent 
between 1940 and 1943 (Historical Statistics, series Ca13) – and a substantial margin for hidden 
prices increases, it is clear that there was a strong incentive to convert to war production.  
  (5) Increasing production and consumption of reclaim. Consumption of reclaim, which was 
only about 0.3 percent of total consumption in 1939, when natural rubber prices were low, rose to 
nearly 40 percent of total consumption in the key years 1943 and 1944.
15  There was a precedent, 
however, for heavy reliance on reclaim: as we will see below, reclaim had played an important role in 
the rubber budget in the 1920s.  
  The flow of scrap rubber to the reclaimers fell precipitously after Pearl Harbor. Owners were 
hoarding scrap on the reasonable speculation that prices would soon rise either because the Office of 
Price Administration would be forced to raise legal maximum prices or because ways around controls 
would be found. In response, the reclaimers, various government agencies, and the petroleum industry, 
quickly reached an agreement to keep the reclaimers supplied by embarking on a high-profile scrap 
drive. The drive lasted from June 15 to July 10, 1942. It was conducted throughout with much fanfare. 
                     
15. The percentages were derived by dividing consumption from reclaim (Table 3, column 4) by the sum 




President Roosevelt announced the initial plan for a two-week drive in a radio address delivered on 
June 12, 1942 (New York Times, June 13, 1942, p. 16). His address stressed, as might be expected, 
that reclaim would help tide the country over until synthetic rubber became available. It also stressed, 
perhaps even more, the uncertainty about how much scrap was available. The only way to find out, 
Roosevelt said, was "to get the used rubber in where it can stand up and be counted."  Once we know 
how much used rubber is available, Roosevelt told his listeners, "we will make our plans accordingly" 
(New York Times, June 13, 1942, p. 16). There was an implicit warning here, and an implicit 
incentive (from the point of view of business), to cooperate: if the scrap drive did not turn up much, 
other measures, in particular gasoline rationing, which was widely touted as a way of conserving 
rubber, would have to be more restrictive. Eric W. Johnston, the president of the U.S. Chambers of 
Commerce, made this point in a circular letter urging his members to cooperate with the scrap rubber 
drive: a successful drive would "weigh heavily against any compulsory conservation efforts on the part 
of the government" (New York Times, June 13, 1942, p. 1). To frame it in a slightly different way, the 
president's talk, although it explicitly assured the public that it was not about gasoline, was in fact 
paving the way for gasoline rationing (Goodwin 1994, 357). 
  As with the other drives, the response was striking: Americans sacrificed their worn out tires, 
hot water bottles, rubber bands, and rubber duckies. Government officials vied to show their 
enthusiasm. The prominent New Dealer Harold Ickes, the Petroleum Administrator for War, 
denounced "hoarders" and in a well-publicized contretemps ordered that the floor mats in the Interior 
Department be scrapped. Unfortunately, it turned out that not all of them were his to donate. In the 
end, the Public Buildings Administration, which did have custody, decided not to scrap some of the 
more valuable mats (New York Times, July 3, 1942). A second problem was that the floor mats 




be unsuitable except for making tires, the most important use of reclaim.
16 According to some experts, 
about the only thing you could make from rubber floor mats was more rubber floor mats (Wall Street 
Journal, June 25, 1942, p.1).  
  Rubber was bought at a penny a pound ($20 per short ton) by filling stations.
17 The Rubber 
Reserve, in turn, reimbursed the Oil companies at the rate of $25 per ton. Profits were donated to 
charity. At the same time, the major reclaimers entered into an agreement with the Rubber Reserve to 
process the scrap with all costs reimbursed by the Rubber Reserve, and again, with any profits to be 
donated to charity. Many people treated a penny a pound as a token price and refused to take it, a 
way of underlining their patriotism. By historical standards, however, it was a high point-of-origin 
price for scrap rubber, and this was important to people who made their living by collecting scrap. 
Although exact figures are not available, one authority put the range of scrap prices between 1915 and 
1940 at $15 to $30 per short ton delivered-at-Akron, with the typical price around $20 per short ton 
(Ball 1947, 150). One reason for setting a high point-of-origin price for scrap may have been 
recognition that incentives matter even in wartime. The high-point of origin price for scrap rubber may 
have reflected the recognition that the aluminum drive had been spoiled in part by the decision to deny 
the junk dealers an adequate incentive. An editorial in Time Magazine for June 8, 1942 made 
precisely this point. But price incentives could have been used to a much greater extent. The same 
article argued that the price of scrap rubber ought to be allowed to rise as high as $50 or $100 dollar 
                     
16. High quality reclaim could be used in combination with natural rubber to make tires. It was not 
possible, however, to make satisfactory tires entirely from reclaim. 
 
17. No one expected motorists to turn in new tires at a penny a pound; there was a limit to what could be 
expected from patriotism. New, unmounted tires in the hands of the public were treated separately: it 






18  The decision to control prices of scrap rubber, and to rely on scrap drives, backed up by 
subsidies paid by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to the scrap brokers, rather than high prices 
to bring in the scrap, was partly the product of the theory of inflation discussed in the preceding 
section. Price increases in scrap rubber, policy makers believed, would produce increases in the 
prices of products made from rubber, and contribute to the increase in the price level. The amount of 
inflation passed through to a final product would be small if it was proportional to the share of scrap 
rubber in the final product. The Office of Price Administration, however, believed that inflation could 
grow in an irrational, cancerous fashion, hence the need to clamp down on inflation at its source. 
  The drive produced approximately 400,000 long tons of scrap. Although some criticisms were 
made of the quality of the scrap procured, the oil industry took pride in the role it dealers had played, 
and in the resulting donations to charity (Petroleum Industry War Council 1943). When the rubber 
drive ended it was thought likely that more rubber drives would be undertaken, but this did not 
happen. The Rubber Reserve maintained its buying price at $25 per short ton until May 1943 when it 
lowered the price to $15 per short ton. This decision reflected the easing of the rubber situation, 
especially in prospect, because of the success of the synthetic rubber program. On January 1, 1944 
the industry supplying scrap rubber to the reclaimers was returned to private hands.  
  The interest of the users of reclaim in promoting a scrap drive was straightforward: since they 
bought at fixed prices, more scrap and hence more reclaim was better. The interest of the oil 
companies was indirect. Gasoline was abundant in most of the country, especially the Southwest, by 
prewar standards, and there was little reason on that account to ration. The exception was part of the 
Northeast where supplies brought by sea had been interrupted by German submarine activity. It was 
                     




widely believed, however, that gasoline rationing and low driving speeds were crucial for conserving 
tires. The U.S. Special Committee to Study the Rubber Situation (1942) –popularly known as the 
Baruch Report – after its chair, Bernard Baruch, head of the War Industries Board in World War I  – 
pushed for nationwide gasoline rationing and a 35 mile per hour speed limit to conserve tires.
19 Thus, 
by promoting scrap rubber collection the oil companies hoped to increase the supply of rubber for 
civilian tires and limit the extent of gasoline rationing. Not only would gasoline rationing reduce 
consumption and profits during the war, it might also accustom some drivers to get along with less 
gasoline and spoil postwar markets. 
  The most baffling positions, on the surface, were those of the reclaimers who agreed to donate 
their profits to charity, and especially the major scrap brokers – four did most of the business – the 
firms that bought scrap rubber from junk dealers, sorted it, and sold it to the reclaimers, who went 
even further. An agreement between the Rubber Reserve Company, which became the sole buyer of 
scrap, and the scrap brokers emphasized reimbursement only for costs (New York Times, Jul 14, 
1942. p. 10). And a history of the industry financed by one of the major scrap rubber brokers and 
published in 1943 described the deal, as being on an "out-and-out no profit basis" (Wolf 1943, 58). 
But it is understandable that the brokers would want at least to be seen as working on a "no profit 
basis." In the Aluminum drive undertaken in 1941, as noted above, Mayor LaGuardia had cut the junk 
dealers out of the business while denouncing them as unpatriotic speculators. The scrap rubber 
brokers wanted to avoid being placed in the same category, even if the public had developed some 
grudging respect for junk men in the wake of the aluminum drive.  
  The scrap rubber brokers, however, did not succeed in avoiding the charge of profiteering. 
Elliott E. Simpson, the counsel for the House subcommittee expediting the scrap rubber drive, charged 
                     




that the brokers had reaped "enormous profits" (New York Times, June 29, 1942. p. 8; July 13, 
1942. p. 17). A case could be made that much of the scrap collected in the drive would turn out to be 
of low quality (some of the floor mats Ickes was keen on scrapping) and costly to sort, so costs may 
have been high. But it would be difficult now to determine whether there were "excessive" profits, even 
if it was possible to define the term. 
  The rubber drive and subsequent purchases of scrap by the Rubber Reserve brought in a 
great deal of scrap, and production and consumption of reclaim was high during the war. But as with 
the other drives, the wartime experience needs to be put in perspective. Numbers suggesting that 
thousands of people contributed scrap, a long and varied list of objects were contributed, and 
computations of the amount collected per person, do not tell us about the economic importance of 
what was contributed.  The key question is whether the drive increased the supply of scrap and the 
production of reclaim to levels substantially above what would have been available in a comparable 
peacetime period.  
  A number of considerations suggest that by this standard the additional scrap made available 
by the drive was relatively small. One indication that wartime consumption of reclaim was close to 
what might have been expected in peacetime in response to a strong market demand is the capacity of 
the reclaimers. The Baruch Report placed the capacity of the reclaimers at the time of the rubber 
drive at 350 thousand long tons per year, assuming intense utilization. The Report, in line with its 
theme of pushing every source of rubber to the maximum, called for a 20 percent increase in the 
capacity of the industry, and production of 400 thousand long tons in 1943. These projections were 
not met. Peak production was 303,991 long tons in 1942 (Table 4, column 4) – an amount well within 
the existing capacity of the prewar industry. 




through the peaks in 1928 (the last peak before the depression) and the peak in 1947 (the first 
postwar peak). Although the war period shows up as a period of high consumption the amounts do 
not appear out of line with peacetime trends. Wartime consumption exceeds the peak-to-peak trend 
in only one year during the war, 1943, and then only by 6.34 percent. The 1943 peak, moreover, was 
only 2 percent above the peak in 1947, was 4 percent below the level reached in 1950, and was fully 
17 percent below the level reached in 1951.
20 
  Consumption of reclaim, which is the only series available before 1940, differs from 
production because of imports, exports, and additions to and subtractions from stocks. The use of the 
consumption figures, however, does not pose a major problem. The practice in the reclaim industry 
was to maintain relatively low inventories of unprocessed and processed scrap. During 1942-1945 
stocks of reclaim on hand at the end of the year averaged less than 2 months consumption, and 
imports and exports were negligible. The Rubber Reserve reported the results of its operations in 
1945 (U.S. Rubber Reserve Company 1945, 57). All told it purchased 990,944 long tons of scrap 
and sold 828,288 to reclaimers. Thus, about 18 percent failed to go through the reclaiming mills, 
although some of this was of low quality and some was purchased after the rubber situation eased.  
  Production figures, as we noted, are available beginning in 1940. The wartime peak for 
production occurred in 1942, when it reached a level 10.3 percent above the level in 1940.  By 1949, 
however, current production exceeded the wartime peak by 2.9 percent, and in 1950 production 
exceeded the wartime peak by 18.5 percent (Table 4, column 4). The production figures, like the 
consumption figures, suggest that the accomplishments of the reclaiming industry during the war years 
                     
20. The latter were war years – the Korean War began in June 1950 – but patriotic pressures to salvage 
scrap were probably much less important than in World War II because synthetic rubber was now a 




were not far above what might have occurred in prosperous peacetime years in which access to 
imported rubber was restricted.   
  As Figure 3 shows, there was also a surge in the consumption of reclaim during the 1920s. 
This episode deserves a closer look because it provides another way to get a sense of what would 
have happened during the World War II if the United States had relied more on the market and less 
on patriotism to get in the scrap.  The troubles in the rubber industry in the 1920s are usually 
associated with the Stevenson Restriction Plan.
 21 The goal of the Plan, which became British law on 
November 1, 1922, was to boost raw rubber prices by limiting exports from British plantations in 
Malaysia (Malaya) and Sri Lanka. It was a response to depressed rubber prices that growers had 
tried to counteract unsuccessfully with voluntary restriction plans. The Plan imposed a prohibitive 
export tax when planters exported more than 60 percent of the amount sold in the year ending 
October 31, 1920. The allowable percent could be raised or lowered by 5 percent based on a scale 
tied to the London price of crude rubber. Prices sagged during the first years under the Plan and the 
amount that could be exported before the prohibitive tax kicked in was lowered. However, in 1925 
heavy demand for rubber produced by the introduction of the rubber-intensive balloon tire ran into a 
supply restricted (at least to some degree) by the Stevenson Plan and the result was a dramatic 
increase in raw rubber prices (Figure 4). 
  Politicians and business leaders did invoke patriotism during the period of high rubber prices in 
the 1920s, so we do not have a completely patriotism-free comparison with the war years. The 
Stevenson Plan outraged Harvey Firestone, and his company's advertisements declared that "America 
Should Produce its Own Rubber." Firestone lobbied his fellow Ohioan, President Warren G. Harding, 
                     




for government support for American rubber plantations in the Western Hemisphere. Enthusiasm 
waned, however, when raw rubber prices retreated in 1922 and 1923. But the rapid increase of 
prices in 1925 led to new calls for a national response. In December 1925 Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover appealed to the public and to the manufacturers for cooperation in beating back high 
rubber prices through conservation and the creation of independent American supplies. Inevitably, 
Congress launched and investigation of "The Means and Methods of Control of Production and 
Export of Crude Rubber." When natural rubber prices broke in February 1926, Hoover took credit 
(New York Times, February 16, 1926, p. 21).
22  The patriotic appeals of Hoover and other leaders 
for conservation may have motivated some people to turn in their scrap. Nevertheless, it seems 
unlikely that in the 1920s patriotism could have functioned on the same scale as in World War II 
because there was no threat to the nation's safety in the 1920s. Indeed, many people viewed Hoover's 
actions as grandstanding designed to improve his prospects for the White House.  
  Figure 4, which shows the annual real prices of natural rubber and reclaim from 1919 to 1947, 
puts the price gyrations of the 1920s into a long-term perspective. The picture is dramatic – a sharp 
increase in the price of raw rubber in the 1920s produced a sharp increase in the demand for 
reclaimed rubber, but a much smaller increase in the price of reclaimed rubber. Evidently, the supply 
of reclaim proved highly elastic. During the early thirties the price of raw rubber tumbled and at its low 
point was about equal to the price of reclaim. During World War II, however, the price of raw rubber 
and the price of reclaim both fell in real terms. This was the result of the limits placed on the prices of 
raw rubber and reclaim by the Office of Price Administration. As with steel, there were some hidden 
                     
22. Most sources attribute the ultimate failure of the Stevenson Plan, which was terminated on 
November 1, 1928, to the effectiveness of the scrap drive, smuggling, and most important, the rapid 




price increases: money paid to "expediters," for example, to get supplies of rubber, and there were 
substantial subsidies paid by the government to the collectors of scrap and the producers of reclaim. 
As with steel, the official wartime prices may be misleading, particularly in the latter part of the war. 
  The amount of reclaim consumed annually during the World War II was higher than during the 
1920s, but the available stock of discarded rubber – the "scrap heap" – was also larger, simply 
because the rubber industry had grown substantially between the 1920s and the 1930s despite the 
depression (Table 4, column 2).
23 To judge whether wartime patriotism made a big difference, we 
need to measure the amount of rubber reclaimed relative to the scrap heap. Unfortunately, estimates of 
the scrap heap made at the beginning of the war differed widely: from 300,000 long tons to 2,000,000 
long tons. In order to compare the two periods I have made my own estimate of the scrap heap based 
on the figures for consumption of natural rubber, which would seem to be the most reliable starting 
point. The assumptions were: (1) that products made from natural rubber, such as tires, were normally 
scrapped after three years,
24 (2) that 75 percent of the original rubber was available for reclaim in the 
first year after scrapping, (3) that any rubber not reclaimed deteriorated another 25 percent each year 
that it remained in the scrap heap, and (4) that scrapping at one half the normal rate took place in 
1942 and 1943.
25  These assumptions were chosen to produce estimates of the annual amount 
scrapped that are close to estimates made by experts during the war, and estimates of the scrap heap 
                     
23. There was also some technological progress in the reclaiming industry – some of it stimulated by the 
high prices for reclaim in the 1920s – that made reclaiming a better substitute for importing raw rubber in 
World War II.  
 
24. This might appear to be a high rate of scrapping. But tire mileage seems to have been much lower 
before World War II. Davis (1931) discusses the low mileage for tires built before the improvements in 
the highway system and the introduction of the balloon tire in the 1920s. Although not strictly accurate I 
also assumed that reclaimed rubber was not reclaimed.  
 
25. The last assumption reflects the idea that motorists tried to keep the existing stock of tires running as 




that fall in the middle of the range of estimates made during the war (Ball 1947, 148).  
  Figure 5 shows consumption of reclaim in each year as a percentage of this estimate of the 
scrap heap. The Figure suggests that the rate of consumption of scrap during World War II was 
similar to what had occurred during the period of high consumption in the 1920s. Admittedly, any 
attempt to infer the size of the "scrap heap" is highly speculative. I tried a variety of measures, based 
on different assumptions about how fast products made from natural rubber were scrapped and how 
fast these products deteriorated once they entered the scrap heap, and the results were similar. The 
simple fact is that production from raw rubber in the late 1930s was higher than in the early 1920s and 
the use of reclaim was much lower. As a result, most measures of the scrap heap that depend on 
recent past production from natural rubber produce rates of consumption during the war, measured as 
percentages of the scrap heap, similar to rates of consumption during the 1920s. 
  The peak-to-peak trend line and the comparison with the 1920s are the simplest ways to get 
at what would have happened in a peacetime boom during the 1940s. To get an alternative that is 
somewhat less dependent on subjective judgments, I regressed consumption of reclaim on lagged 
values of reclaim and contemporaneous and lagged values of industrial production and then compared 
actual and predicted values during the war. Industrial production was included as a proxy for demand. 
As I noted in the case of steel, industrial production is not ideal because the structure of demand 
changed dramatically during the war, but it appears to be the best alternative available because it is 
likely to capture some of the tilt in production toward the industrial sector. I did not include prices 
because, as discussed above, controls distorted prices. In effect, the regression is a reduced form that 
assumes that price responses (of the own price of reclaim and the prices of close substitutes), to 
determinants of demand and supply were "normal" during the war years. This assumption biases the 




increases in the prices of raw rubber and reclaim that would have occurred in a peacetime economy in 
which prices were left free, and the supply of natural rubber was drastically reduced.  
   I began simply with contemporaneous industrial production and then added lagged values of 
industrial production and lagged values of consumption of reclaim as long as they entered significantly. 
I also included dummy variables for 1942, 1943, and 1944, the years when a patriotic effect might 
have been operating. The results are shown in Table 5, part A. Only the 1943 dummy is positive. 
Although the coefficient is not statistically significant, it does show excess consumption of about 
12,800 tons, an increase of 4.57 percent. I examined equations with up to six lags even though the 
coefficients on the additional lags were not significant, but additional lags did not improve the fit of the 
equation, or alter the conclusions with respect to the war years. I also estimated the equation in natural 
logarithms. Again, the only war year with a positive coefficient was 1943, and the coefficient, although 
again not significant, indicated an even smaller effect, 0.8 percent. 
  Since several tests, such as an Augmented Dickey-Fuller, showed that there could be unit 
roots in the reclaim and industrial production series when measured in levels, I also estimated the 
equation in first differences, following the same procedure for establishing the lag length. Table 5, Part 
B shows the results. The main findings of interest here are similar to those that emerge from Part A: the 
dummy variables for 1942, 1943, and 1944 do not show reveal a strong positive effect from 
patriotism. In fact, the coefficients were negative – the sign was always the opposite of what we would 
expect if patriotism made additional supplies available. Only the 1944 coefficient, however, was 
significant.
 26 I also estimated the equation after taking first differences of the natural logarithms of the 
                     
26. In this regression the actual increase in consumption of reclaim did exceed the static forecast by 
about 10.5 percent in 1941. Although there was a good deal of concern about the rubber situation in 
1941, the drive, and the appeals to patriotism, came in the summer of 1942, so it would be hard to 




variables. Again all the coefficients on the wartime dummies were negative, although in this case none 
were significant. The safest conclusion, from the regression estimates, because it is consistent with the 
other evidence, is that any additional amounts of scrap rubber produced by the patriotic drive over 
and above what would have been forthcoming in a prosperous peacetime period in which the supply 
of natural rubber was compromised, at best, must have been relatively small. 
    
VII. What Can We Salvage from the Salvage Drives? 
  Enthusiastic stories about the scrap drives of World War II might lead one to believe that the 
drives had an important impact on the supply of raw materials. This was not the case. To be sure, the 
iron and steel drive and the rubber drive may have made some additional supplies available, but the 
additional amounts were of a much smaller order of magnitude than popular stories about the drives 
might suggest. Historians often describe the scrap drives as if the mobilization of large amounts of 
scrap was unique to the war. Scrap collection, on the contrary, was an ancient, honorable, and 
efficient business that functioned in peace as well as war. The amount of iron and steel salvaged in 
1942 was only 9 percent above the amount salvaged in 1937, the prewar peak. By 1950 more iron 
and steel scrap was being processed than during any year in World War II. The amount processed 
during the war never rose above the peak-to-peak trend. The wartime rubber drive was similar to the 
drive that occurred in the 1920s as a result of a sharp run-up in natural rubber prices. By 1950 more 
rubber scrap was being processed than during any year in World War II. In only one year, 1943, did 
consumption of reclaim rise above the peak-to-peak trend, and then only by a small amount. This and 
other evidence discussed above shows that the scrap drives did not push collections to unprecedented 







  The patriotism that surrounded the drives, moreover, did not erase the importance of 
conventional economic incentives. The aluminum drive suffered because the junk dealers were 
excluded. The rubber drive was more effective because this lesson was learned, and the traditional 
brokers were brought into the program. The fat salvage program was unnecessary, the product of 
special interests seeking a way around price controls and rationing. The lack of adequate price 
incentives complicated the iron and steel scrap drive and made it less effective than it otherwise would 
have been.  
  To be sure, the political and psychological effects of the drives, as many historians have 
argued, may have been important. The prewar aluminum drive may have solidified support for active 
U.S. involvement. And the wartime drives gave Americans on the home front a concrete way to 
display their support for the war. Parents, moreover, could allay the anxieties of their children (and 
themselves) by providing concrete ways that children (and adults) could participate in the war effort 
(Kirk 1995). We should note, however, that historians celebrate Roosevelt's use of the drives to 
influence public opinion partly because they approve of his end purposes. Suppose, to take one 
example, that during a later less popular war a president had launched a "fat salvage" campaign that, as 
in World War II, was ostensibly about providing a raw material to make bombs, but in fact was about 
providing a raw material to make soap so that makers of soap could avoid rationing. Would historians 
of this later less popular war be likely to praise the campaign as a brilliant way of mobilizing public 
opinion, or would they be more likely to condemn it as a cynical attempt to deceive the public and 
                     
27. Strasser (1999, 262) focused on the social dimensions of the drives and did not offer any explicit data 
on the quantity of scrap collected. However, she also concluded that "industrial salvage was simply of 




benefit private interests?  
  Whatever the psychological effects of the drives, the economic effects were limited. Rather 
than demonstrating the importance of non-pecuniary motives and non-market means of production, 
the salvage drives demonstrate the limited ability of patriotism and community spirit to overcome 
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Sources. Nominal: Table 1, column 5. Real: The nominal price in dollars per ton was deflated by the GDP deflator (Historical Statistics 2006, 
series CA13) and set equal to the nominal price in 1929.






Sources. Consumption of Reclaimed Rubber: Table 4, column 1.  






The Real Prices of Natural and Reclaimed Rubber, 1920-1947
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Sources. Prices of natural rubber and reclaimed rubber are from Table 4, columns (5) and (6). The nominal prices were deflated by the GDP 
deflator (Historical Statistics 2006, series CA13). The GDP deflator would seem to be the most relevant series, of those readily available, to 






























Sources. Consumption of Reclaimed Rubber: Table 4, column 1. See the text for the computation of the scrap heap. 47 
Poster 1: "Farm Scrap Builds Tanks & Guns:" 
http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govpub/collections/wwii-posters/img/ww1646-65, accessed June 













Poster 3. "Save Waste Fats" by Henry Koerner. New Hampshire State Library. 










Table 1.  Consumption of Iron and Steel Scrap, 1910-1953. 









  Long Tons  Long Tons  Long Tons  Long Tons  Dollars per 
Long Ton  
  (1)
 a  (2)
 b  (3)  (4)  (5)
 c 
1910  13,100,000  NA  25,825   72,764   NA 
1911  12,100,000
   NA  77,918   17,272   NA 
1912  16,100,000
   NA  105,965   23,612   NA 
1913  15,300,000
   NA  94,429   44,154   NA 
1914  12,200,000
   NA  33,134   34,839   NA 
1915  18,600,000  NA  79,361   79,982   NA 
1916  23,400,000  NA  212,765   116,039   NA 
1917  26,800,000  NA  145,574   180,034   NA 
1918  25,400,000  NA  2,160   63,730   $28.76 
1919  20,700,000  NA  27,275   177,293   17.89 
1920  26,000,000  NA  219,250   140,645   23.71 
1921  12,400,000  NA  37,592   41,469   12.61 
1922  23,700,000  NA  67,784   142,969   15.83 
1923  27,000,000  NA  65,980   162,066   19.05 
1924  26,200,000   NA  97,748   66,841   17.15 
1925  30,700,000   NA  82,573   99,815   17.12 
1926  32,200,000   NA  104,838   86,725   15.48 
1927  30,700,000   NA  239,209   60,207   14.00 
1928  34,000,000   NA  516,148   63,314   14.29 
1929  37,600,000   NA  557,044   90,479   16.30 
1930  26,600,000   NA  358,649   27,482   13.48 
1931  18,300,000   NA  136,125   16,279   9.8 
1932  10,000,000   NA  227,522   9,775   7.54 
1933  17,400,000   NA  773,406   56,133   9.47 
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1935  13,346,752  13,068,578  2,103,959   64,768   11.85 
1936  18,901,389  17,456,744  1,936,132   142,245   14.83 
1937  19,871,033  18,135,239  4,092,590   81,640   18.03 
1938  11,321,341  10,023,593  3,003,523   24,451   13.54 
1939  17,519,550  14,914,857  3,577,427   42,125   16.39 
1940  22,364,030  17,394,597  2,820,789   18,578   18.76 
1941  30,272,035  22,599,622  792,760   86,684   19.50 
1942  29,579,797  24,228,374  126,473   112,365   19.17 
1943  31,283,116  23,762,379  48,957   147,601   19.17 
1944  31,631,437  23,145,723  82,329   114,504   18.55 
1945  27,643,486  22,527,126  73,262   59,385   19.15 
1946  23,334,073  20,848,167  126,426   51,519   20.28 
1947  28,195,000  26,148,000  152,078   63,108   36.65 
1948  28,946,000  29,057,000  189,459   429,218   41.66 
1949  26,041,000  22,475,000  266,603   1,018,182   27.56 
1950  32,095,000  29,402,000  194,114   660,260   34.75 
1951  34,693,521  33,813,709  196,219   339,404   43.15 
1952  31,104,280  30,523,508  300,440   128,841   41.79 
1953  37,411,159  31,614,817  265,985   153,722   39.52 
aTotal through 1934, In House thereafter.  
bThe sum of column's (1) and  (2) is the same as the United States Geological Survey's "Apparent 
Consumption" when both series are available (starting in 1935), except for differences resulting from 
rounding (U.S. Geological Survey 2005). 
cDelivered at Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Chicago. 






Table 2. Determinants of the Consumption of Iron and Steel Scrap, 1910-53. 
  Part A – Levels 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  343,3408.0  1,315,697.  2.609574  0.0131 
STEELSCRAP(-1)  0.434  0.126311  3.43826  0.0015 
IP  149,149.8  13,333.3  11.18623  0.0000 
IP(-1)  -98,716.20.0  18,289.8  -5.39734  0.0000 
1942  -2,491,125.0  3,722,807.0  -0.66915  0.5077 
1943  -10,816,733.0  3,750,454.0  -2.88411  0.0066 
1944  -8,019,789.0  3,600,417.0  -2.22746  0.0323 
 
R-squared  0.965     Mean dependent var  34,160,302 
Adjusted R-squared  0.960     S.D. dependent var  16,793,702 
Log likelihood  -703.6006     F-statistic  167.0401 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.797131     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic  0.477783     Prob. F(4,20)  0.751740 
Obs*R-squared  2.423356     Prob. Chi-Square(4)  0.658411 
Part B – First Differences 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  -664850.8  757261.5  -0.877967  0.3872 
∆STEELSCRAP(-1)  -0.274926  0.164948  -1.666744  0.1063 
∆STEELSCRAP(-2)  -0.248061  0.164146  -1.511218  0.1416 
∆STEELSCRAP(-3)  -0.343551  0.155284  -2.212397  0.0350 
∆(IP)  161178.6  17804.19  9.052846  0.0000 
∆IP(-1)  35179.88  31312.33  1.123515  0.2704 
∆IP(-2)  17559.96  29590.36  0.593435  0.5575 
∆IP(-3)  56285.77  27578.75  2.040911  0.0505 
1942  -5724451.  4656669.  -1.229302  0.2288 
1943  -14583863  4805698.  -3.034702  0.0050 
1944  -10965298  5202546.  -2.107679  0.0438 
         
R-squared  0.783816     Mean dependent var  1343149. 
Adjusted R-squared  0.709270     S.D. dependent var  7381682. 
Log likelihood  4.59E+14     F-statistic  10.51451 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.816695     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic  1.346106     Prob. F(4,20)  0.280744 







Table 3.  The U.S. Rubber Budget, 1935-1945 
(1000s of long tons [2,240 pounds]) 


















  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1935   467   492   312 (7.6)
b  118 (19%)
c  0.2  
1936   487   575   223 (4.7)  142 (20)  0.3  
1937   598   544   262 (5.8)  162 (23)  0.5  
1938   409   438   231 (6.3)  121 (22)  1.0  
1939   497   592   125 (2.5)  170 (22)  1.9  
1940   815   649   289 (5.3)  190 (23)  2.9  
1941   1024   775   533 (8.3)  251 (24)  6.3  
1942   277   377   422 (13.4)  255 (39)  17.6  
1943   52   318   139 (5.3)  291 (37)  170.9  
1944   107   144   96 (8.0)  251 (26)  566.6  
1945   139   105   45 (5.1)  241 (23)  693.5  
           
*1943  52   462   -6   291   26.4  
 
aThe change in end of year stocks can differ from imports less consumption because of re-exports 
and for some other minor reasons. 
 
bThe term in
 parentheses is the stock in months of consumption at the current rate. 
 
cThe term in parentheses is consumption of reclaim as a percent of the total. 
 







Table 4. Consumption, Production, and the Price of Reclaimed Rubber, and Related Data, 1919-
1954. 





Price of Rubber 
(Cents Per Pound) 
  Reclaimed  Natural  Synthetic  Reclaimed  Natural  Reclaimed
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1919  73,500  215,000  0  NA  48.7  16.2 
1920  75.300  206,000  0  NA  36.3  15.5 
1921  41,400  177,800  0  NA  16.4  11.3 
1922  54,500  301,500  0  NA  17.5  9.1 
1923  69,500  319,400  0  NA  29.5  9.6 
1924  76,100  328,800  0  NA  26.2  9.0 
1925  137,100  388,500  0  NA  72.5  10.1 
1926  164,500  366,200  0  NA  48.5  11.7 
1927  189,500  373,000  0  NA  37.7  9.4 
1928  223,000  437,000  0  NA  22.5  8.3 
1929  212,700  467,400  0  NA  20.6  8.0 
1930  153,500  376,000  0  NA  12.0  6.8 
1931  123,000  355,200  0  NA  6.2  5.5 
1932  77,500  336,700  0  NA  3.5  4.1 
1933  85,000  412,400  0  NA  6.0  4.5 
1934  100,900  462,500  0  NA  13.9  5.2 
1935  117,500  491,500  200  NA  13.4  5.3 
1936  141,500  575,000  300  NA  16.4  5.3 
1937  162,000  543,600  500  NA  19.4  6.1 
1938  120,800  438,000  1,000  NA  14.6  6.1 




1940  190,200  648,500  2,900  274,202  20.1  6.0 
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Price of Rubber 
(Cents Per Pound) 
  Reclaimed  Natural  Synthetic  Reclaimed  Natural  Reclaimed
a 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1942  254,820  376,800  17,600  303,991  22.5  6.5 
1943  291,082  317,600  170,900  260,607  22.5  6.5 
1944  251,083  144,100  566,600  243,309  22.5  6.6 
1945  241,036  105,400  693,500  295,612  22.5  7.0 
1946  275,400  277,600  761,700  291,395  22.5  7.3 
1947  288,395  562,661  559,666  266,861  20.8  8.0
b 
1948  261,113  627,332  430,618  224,029  22.0  NA
b 
1949  222,679  574,522  397,139  313,006  17.6  NA
b 
1950  303,733  720,268  512,579  365,933  41.2  NA
b 
1951  346,121  454,015  748,650  273,386  57.7  NA
b 
1952  280,002  453,846  787,454  295,550  33.4  NA 
1953  285,050  553,473  771,806  257,088  24.2  NA 
1954  249,049  596,285  620,223  274,202  23.6  NA 
aFirst Quality. 
 
bAccording to the U.S. National Production Authority (1950,  p. X-4), the price of first grade tire 
reclaim rose from 8 cents in 1947, "to 9 cents in June 1950, and to 10 1/2 cents in September 
1950, where it remained during the first half of 1951."  
Sources. Consumption. 1919-1946: (Ball 1947, 204-05); 1947-1954: (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 1954, 21, table 13). Prices 1919-1946: (Ball 1947, 206-07); 1947-54, natural only, 





Table 5. Determinants of the Consumption of Reclaimed Rubber, 1922-54 
 
Part A – Levels 
  Dependent Variable: Reclaim      
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  16952.03  12346.44  1.373030  0.1824 
RECLAIM(-1)  0.885906  0.174271  5.083500  0.0000 
RECLAIM(-2)  -0.354995  0.178105  -1.993181  0.0577 
IP  5,596.542  1407.204  3.977066  0.0006 
IP(-1)  -7,011.596  2133.495  -3.286437  0.0031 
IP(-2)  4,028.217  1647.816  2.444579  0.0222 
1942  -61,74.551  30186.42  -0.204547  0.8397 
1943  12,794.08  31486.13  0.406340  0.6881 
1944  -42,857.58  30707.63  -1.395666  0.1756 
 
R-squared  0.904632     Mean dependent var  193037.6 
Adjusted R-squared  0.872843     S.D. dependent var  80486.25 
Log likelihood  -380.3048     F-statistic  31.98094 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.609342     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic  1.392266     Prob. F(4,20)  0.272466 
Obs*R-squared  7.187558     Prob. Chi-Square(4)  0.126302 
 
Part B – First Differences 
 
  C  1197.910  5337.789  0.224421  0.8243 
∆RECLAIM(-1)  0.259137  0.170854  1.516718  0.1424 
∆RECLAIM(-2)  -0.375013  0.169725  -2.209528  0.0369 
∆ IP  7406.538  1554.208  4.765473  0.0001 
∆IP(-1)  -3813.767  1676.282  -2.275134  0.0321 
∆ IP(-2)  5126.820  1788.298  2.866872  0.0085 
1942  -38953.31  31014.03  -1.255990  0.2212 
1943  -21918.98  33242.77  -0.659361  0.5159 
1944  -76199.10  32356.37  -2.354995  0.0270 
 
R-squared  0.569587     Mean dependent var  6292.394 
Adjusted R-squared  0.426116     S.D. dependent var  36471.62 
S.E. of regression  27629.11     Akaike info criterion  23.56452 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.751119     Prob(F-statistic)  0.003712 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic  5.066774     Prob. F(4,20)  0.005512 
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